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Abstract
The question about fair income inequality has been an important open ques-
tion in economics and in political philosophy for over two centuries with only
qualitative answers such as the ones suggested by Rawls, Nozick, and Dworkin.
We provided a quantitative answer recently, for an ideal free-market society, by
developing a game-theoretic framework that proved that the ideal inequality is
a lognormal distribution of income at equilibrium. In this paper, we develop
another approach, using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) framework, which
also leads to the same conclusion. Even though the conclusion is the same,
the new approach, however, reveals the true nature of NBS, which has been of
considerable interest for several decades. Economists have wondered about the
economic meaning or purpose of the NBS. While some have alluded to its fair-
ness property, we show more conclusively that it is all about fairness. Since the
essence of entropy is also fairness, we see an interesting connection between the
Nash product and entropy for a large population of rational economic agents.
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1. Introduction
Extreme economic inequality is widely seen as a serious concern to the fu-
ture of stable and vibrant capitalist democracies. In 2015, the World Economic
Forum in Davos identified deepening income inequality as the number one chal-
lenge of our time. As many political observers remarked, the social and political
consequences of extreme economic inequality and the uneven sharing of prosper-
ity seem to have played a role in the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in
2016. Many in the U.S. feel that the nation’s current level of economic inequality
is unfair and that capitalism is not working for 90% of the population [1, 2, 3].
Yet some income inequality is inevitable, even desirable and necessary for a
successful capitalist society. As different people have different talents and skills,
and different capacities for work, they make different contributions in a society,
some more, others less. Therefore, it is only fair that those who contribute more
earn more. But how much more? In other words, what is the fairest inequality
of income? This critical question is at the heart of the inequality debate. The
debate is not so much about inequality per se as it is about fairness.
Consider a simple example to illustrate this point. John is hired as a tempo-
rary worker to perform a job for one hour and makes $100. Lilly also performs
the same job, at the same level of quality, but works for two hours and makes
$200. Is there inequality in their incomes? Of course, there is. But is the in-
equality fair? Of course, it is. Lilly earned more because she contributed more.
Their incomes are not equal, but equitable. They are both paid at the same rate
per hour of work, which is the basis for fairness here.
In this simple case, it was easy to ensure equity, but how do we accomplish
this, in general, in a free market society consisting of millions of workers of
varying degrees of talent, skill, and capacity for work? Is there a measure of
fairness that can guide us to accomplish this? Is there an income distribution
that ensures equity? Given the complexity of the problem, one might anticipate
the answer to be no for both questions. But, surprisingly, the answer is yes,
under certain conditions.
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The first author has shown, in a series of papers [4, 5, 6] and a book [7], that
the measure of fairness we are seeking is entropy and the equitable income dis-
tribution is lognormal at equilibrium in an ideal free market. These results were
arrived at by analyzing the problem in two different, but related, perspectives:
statistical mechanics and potential game theory.
In this paper, we demonstrate yet another approach, namely, the Nash bar-
gaining solution (NBS) formalism [8, 9]. We consider this paper to be valuable
in two respects. One, this is the first time one has proposed the NBS formalism
for the income distribution problem. Even though the NBS formalism has been
well-known for nearly seventy years, and has been used extensively in many fair
allocation problems (see, for example, [9]), we find it quite surprising that it has
not been used to address the central question of fair distribution of income in a
free-market economy. Thus, we consider our NBS formulation to this problem
as an important contribution to economic literature. Secondly, while the final
result of our analysis in itself is not new, this new approach, however, reveals
something unexpected, namely, the true meaning of the Nash product and its
connection with entropy.
In the NBS formalism, one arrives at the solution by maximizing the prod-
uct of utilities, known as the Nash product (more on this in Section 4). Over
the years, economists have wondered about the true meaning, i.e., about the
economic content, of the Nash product. The sum of utilities of different agents
makes economic sense as it gives us the total utility of the system, but why a
product of utilities? What does it stand for?
As Trockel [10] observed:
While all other characterizations, via axioms or via support by equi-
libria of non-cooperative games appear to reflect different aspects of
this solution and to open new ways of interpretation, its most simple
description via the Nash product seems to have escaped up to now
a meaningful interpretation . . . Yet, concerning its direct interpre-
tation the situation is best described by the quotation of Osborne
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and Rubinstein [11] (1994, p. 303): “Although the maximization
of a product of utilities is a simple mathematical operation it lacks
a straightforward interpretation; we view it simply as a technical
device.”
Most people use it as a convenient mathematical device, but what is it really?
Interestingly, the meaning of potential (P ∗) in game theory also had posed
a similar puzzle as Monderer and Shapley [12] had pointed out:
This raises the natural question about the economic content (or in-
terpretation) of P ∗: What do the firms try to jointly maximize? We
do not have an answer to this question.
This is again related to a similar fundamental question raised by Samuelson [13]
decades ago in his Nobel lecture:
What it is that Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” is supposed to be
maximizing?
We showed in our earlier work [6, 7] that Samuelson, and Monderer and
Shapley, were right in suspecting that something quite interesting and deep was
missing in our understanding of these economic theories—what was missing was
the understanding of how the concept of fairness was intimately connected with
all this. We showed that both potential and entropy stand for the concept of
fairness in a distribution and that this is what the ”invisible hand” is maximiz-
ing.
Building on this insight, we offer, in this paper, a novel interpretation of the
Nash product and its connection with entropy and fairness. We show how both
employ the same mathematical device to accomplish the same objective. Our
earlier work showed the deep connection between potential game and statistical
mechanics via the concept of entropy. In this paper, we show how these two
frameworks are deeply connected with the NBS framework via the connection
between entropy and the Nash product. Thus, all three puzzles—the “invisible
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hand,” the potential, and the Nash product—are related in a deep and inter-
esting manner to each other, and to entropy, and all these are all related to the
same critical economic concept, namely, fairness.
2. Potential Game Theoretic Framework: Summary of Past Work
Before we can proceed, we need to recall the central ideas and results from
our earlier work [6, 7], and so we summarize them here for the benefit of the
reader.
Let us first recall the expression we derived for the utility of a rational agent
employed in a company. We arrived at this by seeking to answer the basic
question of why people seek employment. At the most fundamental, survival,
level, it is to be able to pay bills now so that they can make a living, with
the hope that the current job will lead to a better future. One hopes that the
present job will lead to a better one next, acquired based on the experience from
the current job, and to a series of better jobs in the future, and hence to a better
life. Thus, the utility derived from a job is made up of two components: the
immediate benefits of making a living (i.e., “present” utility) and the prospects
of a better future life (i.e., “future” utility). There is, of course, the cost or
disutility of effort or contribution to be accounted for as well.
Hence, we proposed that the effective utility from a job is determined by
these three dominant elements: (i) utility from salary, (ii) disutility of effort or
contribution, and (iii) utility from a fair opportunity for future prospects. By
effort, we do not mean just the physical effort alone, even though it is a part of
it.
Thus, the effective utility for an agent is given by:
hi(Si, Ni) = ui − vi + wi (1)
where hi is the effective utility of an employee earning a salary Si by expending
an appropriate effort, while competing with (Ni−1) other agents in the same job
category i for a fair shot at a better future. u(·) is the utility derived from salary,
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v(·) the disutility from effort, and w(·) is the utility from a fair opportunity for
a better future. Every agent tries to maximize its effective utility by picking an
appropriate job category i.
2.1. Utility of a Fair Opportunity for a Better Future
The first two elements are rather straightforward to appreciate, but the third
requires some discussion. Consider the following scenario. A group of freshly
minted law school graduates (totaling Ni) have just been hired by a prestigious
law firm as associates. They have been told that one of them will be promoted
as partner in eight years depending on her or his performance. Let us say that
the partnership is worth $Q. So any associate’s chance of winning the coveted
partnership goes as 1/Ni, where Ni is the number of associates in her peer
group i, her local competition. Therefore, her expected value for the award is
Q/Ni, and the utility derived from it goes as ln(Q/Ni) because of diminishing
marginal utility. Diminishing marginal utility is a well-known economics concept
that states that the incremental benefit derived by consuming an additional unit
of a resource decreases as one consumes more and more of it. This property
is usually modeled by a logarithmic function. It is important to recognize here
that the benefit (lnQ) lies in the future, but its cost or disutility (ln(1/Ni))
is paid in the present, in the daily competition with one’s peers towards the
partnership. This is akin to buying a lottery ticket. The cost (say, $1) of the
ticket is incurred right away, right at the purchase, but the benefit of potentially
winning a large sum lies in the future. For the time being, one is out $1—this
disutility is to be accounted for right away.
Therefore, the disutility incurred towards a fair opportunity for career ad-
vancement in a competitive environment is:
wi(Ni) = −γ lnNi (2)
where γ is a constant parameter. This equation models the effect of competitive
interaction between agents. Considering the society at large, this equation cap-
tures the notion that in a fair society, an appropriately qualified agent with the
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necessary education, experience, and skills should have a fair shot at growth op-
portunities irrespective of her race, color, gender, and other such factors—i.e., it
is a fair competitive environment. This is the cost or the disutility incurred for
equality of access or equality of opportunity for a better life, for upward mobil-
ity. The category i would correspond to her qualification category in the society.
The other agents in that category are the ones she will be competing with for
these growth opportunities.
2.2. Modeling the Disutility of a Job
For the utility derived from salary, we again employ the commonly used
logarithmic utility function:
ui(Si) = α lnSi (3)
where α is another constant parameter. As for the effort component, every job
has certain disutility associated with it. This disutility depends on a host of
factors such as the investment in education needed to qualify oneself for the
job, the experience to be acquired, working hours and schedule, quality of work,
work environment, company culture, relocation anxieties, etc. To model this,
one can combine u and v to compute
unet = au− bv (a and b are positive constant parameters) (4)
which is the net utility (i.e., net benefit or gain) derived from a job after ac-
counting for its cost. Typically, net utility will increase as u increases (because
of salary increase, for example). However, generally, after a point, the cost has
increased so much, due to personal sacrifices such as working overtime, missing
quality time with family, giving up on hobbies, job stress resulting in poor men-
tal and physical health, etc., unet begins to decrease after reaching a maximum.
The simplest model of this commonly occurring inverted-U profile is a quadratic
function, as in
unet = au− bu
2. (5)
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Since, u ∼ ln(Salary), we get equation (6):
vi(Si) = β(lnSi)
2. (6)
2.3. Effective Utility from a Job
Combining all three, we have
hi(Si, Ni) = α lnSi − β(lnSi)
2 − γ lnNi (7)
where α, β, γ > 0.
In general, α, β and γ, which model the relative importance an agent assigns
to these three elements, can vary from agent to agent. However, we examined
the ideal situation where all agents have the same preferences and hence treat
these as constant parameters.
2.4. Equilibrium Income Distribution
We then used the potential game theoretic framework to prove [6, 7] that a
large population of agents with this utility function will reach Nash equilibrium.
In potential games [14, 15, 16], there exists a single scalar-valued global function,
called a potential, that captures the necessary information about utilities. The
gradient of the potential is the utility. For such games, Nash equilibrium is
reached when the potential is maximized.
So, using the potential game formalism, we have an employee’s utility as the
gradient of potential φ(x), i.e.,
hi(x) ≡
∂φ(x)
∂xi
(8)
where xi = Ni/N denotes the fraction of population at category i and x is the
population vector. Therefore, by integration (we replace partial derivative with
total derivative because hi(x) can be reduced to hi(xi) expressed in (1)–(6)),
φ(x) =
n∑
i=1
∫
hi(x)dxi. (9)
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We observe, using (7), that our game is a potential game with the potential
function
φ(x) = φu + φv + φw + constant (10)
where
φu = α
n∑
i=1
xi lnSi (11)
φv = −β
n∑
i=1
xi(lnSi)
2 (12)
φw =
γ
N
ln
N !∏n
i=1(Nxi)!
(13)
where we have used Stirling’s approximation in equation (13).
One can see that φ(x) is strictly concave:
∂2φ(x)
∂x2i
= −
γ
xi
< 0 (14)
Therefore, a unique Nash equilibrium for this game exists, where φ(x) is maxi-
mized, as per the well-known theorem in potential games [15, p. 60].
Thus, the self-organizing free market dynamics, where employees switch jobs,
and companies switch employees, in search of better utilities or profits, ulti-
mately reaches an equilibrium state, with an equilibrium income distribution.
This happens when the potential φ(x) is maximized. The equilibrium income
distribution is the following lognormal distribution:
xi =
1
SiD
exp

−
(
lnSi −
α+γ
2β
)2
γ/β

 (15)
where D = N exp
[
λ/γ − (α+ γ)2/4βγ
]
and λ is the Lagrange multiplier
used in maximizing φ(x) with the
∑n
i=1 xi = 1 constraint.
We also proved that the effective utility, h∗, at equilibrium is given by:
h∗ = γ lnZ − γ lnN (16)
where Z =
∑n
j=1 exp
(
[α lnSj − β(lnSj)
2]/γ
)
resembles the partition func-
tion seen in statistical mechanics (it is easy to show that λ = h∗). At equilibrium,
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all agents enjoy the same effective utility or effective welfare, h∗. Everyone is
not making the same salary, of course, but they all enjoy the same effective
utility. This is an important result, for it proves that all agents are treated
equally with respect to the economic outcome, namely, effective utility. This
proves that the ideal free-market exhibits outcome fairness.
We also proved that this distribution is socially optimal. A socially optimal
distribution is one where the effective utility of the entire population (i.e., the
total effective utility of society, H) is maximized. This is the outcome desired
by utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. This maximum
total effective utility (H∗) is given by
H∗ =
n∑
i=1
Nih
∗
i =
N∑
j=1
h∗j = Nh
∗ (17)
(since h∗i = h
∗
j = h
∗ at equilibrium), subject to the constraints
n∑
i=1
NiSi =M (18)
n∑
i=1
Ni = N (19)
Note that the index i covers the n different salary levels Si, whereas j covers
the N employees. M is the total salary budget and N is the total number of
employees in a company.
Now that we have covered the necessary background work, we are ready to
forge ahead to develop the Nash bargaining solution framework and its con-
nection to maximum entropy. Towards that, let us first provide an intuitive
explanation of the maximum entropy principle.
3. Entropy as a Measure of Fairness: An Intuitive Explanation of
S = −
∑n
i=1
pi ln pi
As we know, entropy is maximized at statistical equilibrium. We also know
that the equivalent defining criterion for statistical equilibrium is the equality
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of all accessible phase space cells, which, in fact, is the fundamental postulate
of statistical mechanics. In other words, a given molecule is equally likely to be
found in any one of the accessible phase space cells, at any given time.
For example, consider a very large number of identical gas molecules enclosed
in a chamber. To say that a gas molecule, in the long run, is more likely to be
found in the left half of the chamber than the right, and assign it a higher prob-
ability (say, p(left) = 0.6 and p(right) = 0.4), would be a biased and an unfair
assignment of probabilities. This assignment presumes some information that
has not been given. What does one know about the molecule, or its surrounding
space, that would make one prefer the left chamber over the right? There is
no basis for this preference. The unequal assignment of probabilities is thus
arbitrary and unwarranted. Therefore, the fairest assignment of probabilities is
one of equality of outcomes, i.e., p(left) = 0.5 and p(right) = 0.5.
Let us examine this example further. Let us say that the chamber is divided
into n imaginary partitions of equal volume such that the molecules are free
to move about from partition to partition. As noted, the essence of statistical
equilibrium is the equality of all accessible phase space cells. But how is this
connected to the maximization of entropy as defined by S = −
∑n
i=1 pi ln pi (not
to be confused with salary S)? The connection is not obvious from this equation.
However, there is a fascinating connection with an important implication on the
true nature of entropy, as well as for the Nash product.
Now, the criterion for equilibrium in our chamber example is
p1 = p2 = . . . = pn = p (20)
where pi is the probability of finding a given molecule in the partition i.
But how do we recognize and enforce this criterion in practice?
This is easy to do, for example, if there are only a few partitions in phase
space, e.g., two partitions, left and right, as we did above. We would im-
mediately recognize a non-equilibrium situation if one had p(left) = 0.6 and
p(right) = 0.4. And we would also recognize with equal ease the equilibrium
situation, p(left) = 0.5 and p(right) = 0.5.
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But this gets trickier when there are a large number of partitions or cells in
phase space. For example, what if there are 1000 partitions, as opposed to just
two, and we are given the following two situations to evaluate?
p1 = 0.0015, p2 = 0.001, p3 = 0.0009, . . . , p1000 = 0.0011
p1 = 0.0011, p2 = 0.0008, p3 = 0.0012, . . . , p1000 = 0.0009
Since all the partitions are of equal volumes, at equilibrium,
p1 = p2 = ... = p1000 = 0.001
How do we compare these two configurations and determine which one is closer
to equilibrium? In general, how do we make this comparison among billions of
such alternative configurations? How do we enforce this equality criterion?
One could compute the sum of squared residuals for comparison, or other
such methods, but this gets to be really tedious and messy, when the number
of molecules and the number of configurations run into billions as is typical in
statistical mechanics. Is there a simpler, more elegant way of accomplishing
this? It turns out there is, one that exploits a wonderful result regarding the
product of a set of positive numbers that sum to a fixed amount. This is what
is at the heart of the entropy equation, and the Nash product as we show later.
While we recognize the equilibrium state by the maximum entropy crite-
rion, hidden in its mathematical form is the equality of all accessible cells cri-
terion given by equation (20). To see this, we first observe that maximizing{
−
∑n
i=1 pi ln pi
}
is the same as maximizing
{
− ln
∏n
i=1 p
pi
i
}
. And this is the
same as minimizing
{
ln
∏n
i=1 p
pi
i
}
, which is the same as minimizing
{∏n
i=1 p
pi
i
}
.
Now, according to two well-known results (which are related), the arithmetic
mean-geometric mean inequality theorem (AM–GM theorem) [17], and the
Jensen’s inequality, this product is minimized if and only if
p1 = p2 = .... = pn
where 0 < pi < 1 and
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 (one can also demonstrate this using the
Lagrangian multiplier method, but, we believe, the geometric intuition is more
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transparent using the AM-GM theorem or the Jensen’s inequality). This equal-
ity is, of course, the fundamental criterion for statistical equilibrium. Therefore,
when we maximize entropy, what we are really doing is enforcing this equality
constraint buried in it. This is a clever mathematical trick for enforcing equal-
ity, by exploiting this important relationship between the product and the sum
of a set of positive numbers. Therefore, enforcing equality and hence fairness,
is the objective buried in the mathematical trick of maximizing the product,{
-
∏n
i=1 p
pi
i
}
, which is the same as minimizing
{∏n
i=1 p
pi
i
}
. We will now see
in the next section how the same clever mathematical device of maximizing a
product to test and enforce equality is employed for the Nash product.
We can see clearly now how entropy maximization is related to enforcing
equality, which is the same as enforcing fairness—treating equal things equally.
This insight that entropy really is a measure of fairness in a distribution has
never been clearly recognized in statistical mechanics, in information theory,
or in economics literature until the first author discussed its importance in his
2009–2010 papers [4, 5]. It is a historical accident that the concept of entropy
was first discovered in the context of thermodynamics and, therefore, it has
generally been identified as a measure of randomness or disorder. However,
the true essence of entropy is fairness, which appears with different masks in
different contexts (for a detailed discussion of this, see[7]).
4. Nash Bargaining Solution
We now derive the Nash bargaining solution to our problem. Following
Nash’s original formulation [8] for the two-player bargaining problem there has
been extensive literature on this topic, which has been generalized to the n-
player case using both cooperative and noncooperative approaches with many
applications (we cite a few select papers here [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 9, 24, 25,
26, 27]).
We consider N players labeled j = 1, . . . , N (use j instead of i for the index
of individual players), and we consider only the grand coalition involving all N
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players because all N players are required for the company to succeed. The
surplus that this coalition generates is non-negative. Once this team forms, the
game stops.
Suppose that players 1, . . . , N , have complementary skills which can be com-
bined to produce a divisible pie of some total utility. The pie is produced and
divided among the N players only when all players reach an agreement on their
shares (h1, h2, . . . , hN ), where hj is the share or the utility of the jth player.
The following description of the NBS is adapted from [21]:
Consider a cooperative game of N players (e.g., employees in a
company). Let each individual player j have an utility function
hj(x) : X → R where X is a convex, closed, and bounded set of
RN . For example, in communication networks X denotes the space
of throughputs. Let hd = [hd,1, hd,2, . . . , hd,N ] where hd,j = hj(xd)
for some xd ∈ X denote a disagreement point which all the play-
ers agree to as a starting point for the game. In general, hd can
be thought of as the vector of individual default utilities which the
users would like to achieve, at least, if they enter the game. It is also
referred to as the threat point. Let [H,hd] denote the game defined
on X with initial disagreement point hd where H denotes the image
of the set X under h(·), i.e., h(X) = H. Let F [·,hd] : H → H be an
arbitration strategy. Then F is said to be a NBS if it satisfies the
four axioms below.
1. Let ψ(h) = h′ where h′j = ajhj + bj for j = 1, 2, . . . , N and
aj > 0, bj are arbitrary constants. Then
F [ψ(H), ψ(hd)] = ψ(F [H,hd]). (21)
This states that the operating point in the space of strategies
is invariant with respect to linear utility transformations.
2. The solution must satisfy
(F [H,hd])j ≥ hd,j (j = 1, 2, . . . , N) (22)
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and furthermore there exists no h ∈ H such that hj ≥ (F [H,hd])j
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , N . This is the notion of Pareto optimality
of the solution.
3. Let [H1,hd] and [H2,hd] be two games with the same initial
agreement point such that:
H1 ⊂ H2 (23)
F [H2,hd] ∈ H1. (24)
Then F [H1,hd] = F [H2,hd]. This is called the independence
of irrelevant alternatives axiom. This states that the NBS of a
game with a larger set of strategies is the same as that of the
smaller game if the arbitration point is a valid point for the
smaller game. The additional strategies are superfluous.
4. Let H be symmetrical with respect to a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}
of indices (i.e., let j, k ∈ J and j < k), then
{h1, h2, . . . , hj−1, hk, hj+1, . . . , hk−1, hj, hk+1, . . . , hN} ∈ H.
(25)
If hd,j = hd,k, then (F [H,hd])j = (F [H,hd])k for j, k ∈ J. This
is the axiom of symmetry which states that if the set of utilities
is symmetric then, for any two players, if the initial agreement
point corresponds to equal performance, then their arbitrated
values are equal.
Nash proved that the unique solution, i.e., the NBS, of the game that satisfies the
four axioms is given by the point which maximizes the expression
∏N
j=1(hj(x)−
hd,j), known as the Nash product. This can be written as
max
N∏
j=1
(hj(x)− hd,j) = max
N∏
j=1
(hj − hd,j) (26)
where hj denotes both the jth player’s utility function and its utility.
15
5. NBS of the Income Distribution Game
In this section, we define the set of feasible utilities of the income game
and show that it is a convex set. By maximizing the product of utilities over
such set, we obtain the NBS of the income game and it is identical to the Nash
equilibrium solution we had reported earlier [6].
Recall the utility function hi(Si, Ni) defined in (7). Suppose the n salary
levels are predetermined. Then the utility for agents at each salary level solely
depends on its occupancy, that is
hi(Ni) = h0,i − γ lnNi (27)
where h0,i ≡ α lnSi − β(lnSi)
2 is a constant unique to the ith salary level.
We now define the set of population N
N ≡ {Ni ∈ Z+ :
n∑
i=1
Ni ≤ N} (28)
where the total number of agents does not exceed N . It is easy to verify that
N is convex. Next, we construct the set of utilities H through the following
mapping:
H ≡ {hi = h0,i − γ lnNi :
n∑
i=1
Ni ≤ N}. (29)
To show that H is also convex, let h1 = h0−γ lnN1 and h2 = h0−γ lnN2 be
any two vectors of utilities in H. They corresponds to two vectors of occupancies
N1 ∈ N and N2 ∈ N. Define h3 as the convex combination of h1 and h2:
h3 ≡ th1 + (1− t)h2
= h0 − γ[t lnN1 + (1 − t) lnN2]
= h0 − γ lnN3
(30)
where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 is the ratio of the convex combination andN3 ≡ e
t lnN1+(1−t) lnN2 .
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We have
n∑
i=1
Ni,3 =
n∑
i=1
et lnNi,1+(1−t) lnNi,2
≤
n∑
i=1
[
telnNi,1 + (1 − t)elnNi,2
]
=
n∑
i=1
[tNi,1 + (1 − t)Ni,2]
= t
n∑
i=1
Ni,1 + (1− t)
n∑
i=1
Ni,2
≤ tN + (1− t)N
= N
(31)
where Ni,j is the ith component of the vector Nj . The first inequality
et lnNi,1+(1−t) lnNi,2 ≤ telnNi,1 + (1− t)elnNi,2 (32)
follows Jensen’s inequality where
f
(
tx1 + (1− t)x2
)
≤ tf(x1) + (1− t)f(x2) (33)
if the function f(x) is convex; and the second follows the definition of N. h3 is
therefore also in H because N3 is in N.
Recall that the NBS is obtained by maximizing the Nash product in (26).
By grouping players with the same amount of utility together (i.e., they are in
the same income level), we convert the original NBS problem to the following
problem:
max
x∈X
N∏
j=1
(hj(x)− hd,j) = max
h∈H
n∏
i=1
hNii (34)
where we have set the disagreement point or the threat point of the jth player
hd,j to be zero (i.e., a player agrees to enter the game as long as her effective
utility is greater than zero). Note that the first product is over all the players
(N) whereas the second is over all the levels (n).
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Therefore, (34) is equivalent to solving
max g(N) =
n∑
i=1
Ni lnhi
s.t. l(N) =
n∑
i=1
Ni −N ≤ 0
(35)
because logarithm is continuous and monotonic. The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) necessary conditions of (35) are as follows:
∇g(N∗) = µ∇l(N∗) (36)
l(N∗) ≤ 0 (37)
µ ≥ 0 (38)
µl(N∗) = 0 (39)
where µ is a KKT multiplier. Expanding (36), we have
lnh∗i −
γ
h∗i
= µ (i = 1, . . . , n). (40)
There exists a unique solution to (40) where h∗i = h
∗ = γ/W (γe−µ) and W
denotes the Lambert-W (product log) function. Since W (x) monotonically in-
creases as x ≥ 0 increases, h∗ is maximized when µ > 0. From the complemen-
tary slackness in (39), we have l(N∗) = 0 or
n∑
i=1
Ni = N. (41)
From (27), we have
h∗ = α lnSi − β(lnSi)
2 − γ lnN∗i . (42)
The NBS of the income game therefore requires
N∗i =
N
SiD
exp

−
(
lnSi −
α+γ
2β
)2
γ/β

 (43)
where D = exp
[
h∗/γ − (α + γ)2/4βγ
]
. Equation (43) is identical to the Nash
equilibrium solution (15) since λ = h∗. This corresponds to all agents enjoying
the same effective utility h∗ at equilibrium given by equation (16).
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6. Summary and Conclusions
We have presented a Nash bargaining solution to the problem of fair income
distribution in an ideal free-market economy. As noted, this is the first time
the NBS formalism has been proposed for this problem even though the formal-
ism itself has been well-known for about seven decades and the fair inequality
question has been open for over two centuries.
In addition, since the NBS outcome results in a lognormal distribution, which
we have proved in our earlier work as the fairest outcome, we see the connection
between NBS and fairness. By maximizing the Nash product, we are indeed
maximizing fairness. We also showed that by maximizing entropy one was
essentially maximizing fairness in the probability distribution by enforcing the
equality of all accessible cells through the mathematical device of maximizing the
product −ln
∏n
i=1 p
pi
i , which is the same as minimizing
∏n
i=1 p
pi
i , by exploiting
the arithmetic mean–geometric mean inequality theorem or Jensen’s inequality.
In a similar manner, in NBS one again invokes the mathematical device of
maximizing a product, this time the Nash product. Both techniques achieve
the same desired result —the enforcement of equality. In the case of maximum
entropy, we achieve the equality of the probabilities of all accessible phase space
cells — p1 = p2 = ... = pn. That is, we achieve maximizing fairness at equi-
librium. Similarly for NBS, we achieve the equality of effective utilities for all
agents — h1 = h2 = ... = hN = h
∗. That is, we achieve maximizing fairness at
equilibrium.
Thus, the true economic objective of maximizing the Nash product is to treat
all agents fairly subject to the Pareto optimality constraint. Since the fairness
objective is buried deeply in the mathematical device of maximizing the prod-
uct, just as it is buried in the formulation of maximum entropy principle, the
fairness property is not obvious even when you probe it. So, naturally, people
are surprised when they find the fairness outcome in the final results. That
is why we have economists somewhat mystified, making observations such as
“Nash product seems to have escaped up to now a meaningful interpretation,”
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“Although the maximization of a product of utilities is a simple mathematical
operation it lacks a straightforward interpretation; we view it simply as a tech-
nical device,” and “The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare” [28],
as quoted earlier. Thus, our work reveals the deep and surprising connection be-
tween the Nash product, entropy, and fairness. Achieving maximum fairness is
the purpose of the maximum entropy principle as well as for the maximum Nash
welfare function. Enforcing equality and hence fairness, under the given con-
straints, is the true objective buried in the mathematical device of maximizing
a product—we see this in entropy and in Nash product.
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